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Spoiled Broth? Section 895 of the Oklahoma Economic 
Development Pooled Finances Act Bounces Between 
Committees and Co-opts Terms to Defend Your New Back 
Yard 
I. Introduction 
Development fees (also called impact fees) have traditionally been 
utilized by municipalities to address infrastructure costs associated with 
new development, and reflect the burden that additional development 
imposes on municipal infrastructure.1 Municipal development fees are often 
assessed through a conferred taxation power from the state or tied to a 
municipality’s zoning power.2 Specific to this comment, section 895 of the 
Oklahoma Economic Development Pooled Finances Act (section 895) 
addresses development fees assessed through a zoning or permitting 
power.3 Though development fees have historically been utilized to offset 
the direct costs associated with new development (for example, water and 
wastewater service, police and fire protection, or roadways), 
contemporarily many municipalities that occupy large land areas have 
turned to development fees to address city sprawl.4 These municipalities 
have ratcheted up such fees in attempts to encourage density in new 
construction, arguing that new developments should pay for their actual 
costs to the municipalities.5 At a minimum, development fees serve to 
ensure that new development absorbs all infrastructure costs associated 
with the construction, rather than passing costs to the already existing 
community.6 
                                                                                                                 
 1. 1 JAMES A. KUSHNER, SUBDIVISION LAW AND GROWTH MANAGEMENT § 6:31 (2d ed. 
2012). The term “development fee” will be used in this comment as used in 62 OKLA. STAT. 
§ 895 (2011). 
 2. Benjamin S. Kingsley, Note, Making It Easy to Be Green: Using Impact Fees to 
Encourage Green Building, 83 N.Y.U. L. REV. 532, 553 (2008). 
 3. 62 OKLA. STAT. § 895(A)(1). 
 4. Ronald H. Rosenberg, The Changing Culture of American Land Use Regulation: 
Paying for Growth with Impact Fees, 59 SMU L. REV. 177, 180-82 (2006). 
 5. See Richard L. Settle & Charles G. Gavigan, The Growth Management Revolution 
in Washington: Past, Present, and Future, 16 U. PUGET SOUND L. REV. 867 (1993) 
(surveying the State of Washington’s statutory growth management scheme). 
 6. David L. Callies & Malcolm Grant, Paying for Growth and Planning Gain: An 
Anglo-American Comparison of Development Conditions, Impact Fees and Development 
Agreements, 23 URB. LAW. 221, 222-23 (1991) (“Under the schemes for ‘impact fees,’ now 
operated in several states, the developer is charged a fee that is calculated in accordance with 
the type, scale and location of the proposed development and is applied to mitigate its impact 
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Oklahoma Senate Bill 708 establishes the standards Oklahoma’s 
municipalities must meet in adopting development fees.7 This comment 
focuses on the constitutional requirements for such fees, the judicial 
background in Oklahoma, and changes the bill makes in this field. This 
comment also attempts to reconcile seemingly discordant portions of the 
bill, and predict how a court tasked with analyzing the statute would rule. 
Part II of this comment presents the statute itself and pinpoints issues 
within the text, focusing on subsections (B) and (K). In contrast to the 
majority of the bill, which focuses on matters of administration, these 
subsections set out the standards that courts must use to determine the 
propriety of an enacted development fee. Part III presents the federal 
constitutional background; specifically, this section focuses on Nollan v. 
California Coastal Commission8 and Dolan v. City of Tigard.9 Though 
these cases addressed property exactions, their holdings have been extended 
in many jurisdictions to development fees. Part IV addresses state and 
federal interpretations of the constitutional framework, with an appropriate 
focus on Oklahoma courts. This section highlights the commonalities 
(though they are few) between the Nollan/Dolan line of cases and 
Oklahoma case law. These similarities will color the manner in which the 
statute must be interpreted. Part V presents statutory construction and 
interpretive issues through the appropriate lens of the foundational case 
law. As a relevant aside, this section also addresses the manner in which 
Oklahoma maintains legislative history and its effects on statutory 
interpretation. Part VI notes other minor but potentially serious issues in 
reconciling the text, with a focus on the definitions provided in the 
beginning of the text and the method through which development fees are 
assessed in the statute. 
II. Background and History, Oklahoma City as an Example 
Oklahoma City is colossal. By land area, it is the third-largest city in the 
United States among cities with populations of at least 100,000 citizens.10 
                                                                                                                 
on the community. A properly designed fees system attempts to allocate infrastructure costs 
equitably between developers in accordance with an adopted schedule of capital facilities, 
and to offer a guarantee that the infrastructure will actually be provided within a specified 
time, or the fee returned.”). 
 7. 62 OKLA. STAT. § 895. 
 8. 483 U.S. 825 (1987). 
 9. 512 U.S. 374 (1994). 
 10. Cities with 100,000 or More Population in 2000 Ranked by Land Area, U.S. CENSUS 
BUREAU, http://www.census.gov/statab/ccdb/cit1010r.txt (last visited Aug. 18, 2013). 
2013]       COMMENTS 157 
 
 
Its more than 600 square miles, however, are home to only around half of a 
million citizens.11 As a consequence, the cost of municipal infrastructure 
and public service in Oklahoma City is much higher per capita than in cities 
of similar population with higher population densities. In 2003, the City of 
Oklahoma City unsuccessfully proposed increasing development fees to 
curtail municipal layoffs;12 in 2008, the city again proposed levying 
additional development fees, estimating that each new residential unit 
placed a $4856 burden on the municipality’s infrastructure.13 Though the 
movement toward increasing development fees has not gained traction, 
perhaps due to a downturn in residential construction14 or a concern that 
new development would move to neighboring municipalities,15 Senate Bill 
708 passed the Oklahoma legislature in May 2011 and was codified at title 
62, section 895 of the Oklahoma Statutes.16 
Despite the ease of its passage, codification of the statute was not an 
efficient process. It is notable that the bill moved through numerous 
committees prior to its codification, which is perhaps the cause of the 
internal conflicts noted in this comment.17 Chronologically, the bill was 
referred to the General Government Committee; referred to the Judiciary 
Committee; referred to the Economic Development, Tourism, and Financial 
Services Committee; again referred to the Judiciary Committee; and again 
referred to the Economic Development, Tourism, and Financial Services 
Committee.18 In all, there were eight iterations of the bill.19 Indeed, many 
legislators had input during the course of the bill’s passage. 
Though the measure was criticized by some Oklahoma state senators as 
taking away “local control,” the bill passed the Oklahoma Senate handily.20 
                                                                                                                 
 11. About Oklahoma City, CITY OF OKLA. CITY, http://www.okc.gov/about/index.html 
(last visited Aug. 18, 2013). 
 12. Bryan Dean, Raising Building Fees Touted as a Way for City to Avoid Cutting Jobs, 
OKLAHOMAN, May 14, 2003, at B1. 
 13. Richard Mize, City Mulls Construction Fee, OKLAHOMAN, Nov. 22, 2008, at B6. 
 14. Id. 
 15. Bryan Dean, How to Pay for City Growth? Builder Fees, Council Told, 
OKLAHOMAN, Apr. 18, 2007, at A12. 
 16. See S.B. 708, 2011 Leg., 53rd Sess. (Okla. 2011); see also 62 OKLA. STAT. § 895 
(2011). 
 17. State of Oklahoma History of a Bill: Measure Number(s) SB 708, 2012 Regular 
Session (Nov. 7, 2011) [hereinafter History of a Bill: SB708]  (on file with the Oklahoma 
Law Review). 
 18. Id. 
 19. Id. 
 20. Development Impact Fee Bill Heads to Governor, 23RD & LINCOLN (May 3, 2011), 
http://jrlr.net/23rd-and-Lincoln/2011/05/03/development-impact-fee-bill-heads-to-governor/. The 
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Certainly, developers wished to maintain the low development fees in the 
State of Oklahoma as compared to other jurisdictions.21 And, though no 
immediate threat loomed on the horizon, the bill may turn out to be a 
prescient maneuver by the construction community as curtailment of city 
sprawl and equitable division of infrastructure costs gain support in 
Oklahoma City.22 As the gap widens between city expenses and revenue, as 
is projected, Oklahoma City may have to look beyond development fees to 
address growing costs.23 
III. Section 895: The Text and Its Issues 
Oklahoma Senate Bill 708 of the first session of the fifty-third legislature 
(that is, section 895) was first read on February 7, 2011,24 and was signed 
into law on May 10, 2011, by Governor Mary Fallin.25 
A. A Brief Survey of the Text 
The text of the statute is exhaustive, but it will be advantageous to have 
at least a flavor of the measure in the reading of this comment. The statute 
begins by mandating that municipalities that adopt development fees 
comply with the statute, and it continues with statutory definitions.26 The 
purposive definition of “development fee” is particularly worth noting; in 
full, the definition states: 
“Development fee” means any payment of money imposed, in 
whole or in part, as a condition of approval of any building 
permit, plat approval, or zoning change, to the extent the fee is to 
                                                                                                                 
Senate passed the House amendments with thirty-four in favor and only eight opposed (six 
senators were excused). S. JOURNAL, 53rd Leg., 1st Sess. 1056 (Okla. 2011), available at 
http://www.oksenate.gov/publications/senate_journals/sj2011/sj20110503.pdf. 
 21. Mize, supra note 14. 
 22. See Michael Kimball, OKC Meeting Draws 500 to Discuss Urban Sprawl, 
OKLAHOMAN, Sept. 7, 2011, at A10. 
 23. On its current course, Oklahoma City is projected to have a budget shortfall of $18.7 
million by 2017. Clifton Adcock, The Gap Trap, OKLA. GAZETTE, Feb. 8, 2012, at 14, 
available at http://npaper-wehaa.com/oklahoma-gazette/2012/02/08/#?article=1512635. 
 24. S. JOURNAL, 53rd Leg., 1st Sess. 206 (Okla. 2011), available at http://www. 
oksenate.gov/publications/senate_journals/sj2011/sj20110207.pdf. 
 25. S. JOURNAL, 53rd Leg., 1st Sess. 1103 (Okla. 2011), available at http://www. 
oksenate.gov/publications/senate_journals/sj2011/sj20110510.pdf. 
 26. See 62 OKLA. STAT. § 895(A) (2011). 
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pay for public infrastructure systems that are attributable to new 
development or to expand or modify existing development.27 
Subsection (B) provides that new and expanded or modified 
development can only be charged for capital improvement that “increases 
or expan[ds] . . . the capacity of public infrastructure systems attributable to 
that development.”28 The subsection mandates that “[d]evelopment fees 
shall not exceed a clear, ascertainable, and reasonably determined 
proportionate share of the cost” of the infrastructure improvement 
attributable to the increase or expansion of the service capacity; requires “a 
clearly established functional nexus between the purpose and amount of the 
development fee being charged and the development against which the fee 
is charged;” and establishes a documentation requirement that the 
“development fee is reasonably and roughly proportional to the nature and 
extent of the impact of development.”29 This subsection also provides that 
development fees cannot be assessed for repairs, that the fees must be based 
upon actual costs or “reliable, ascertainable and reasonable projected 
estimates,” and that development fees are limited to “public infrastructure 
system capital improvements.”30 
Subsection (C) mandates the provision of a development fee schedule 
based upon land use, the purpose of the fee, and termination upon funding 
of the purpose of the fee.31 Additionally, a capital improvement plan that 
lists the necessary public infrastructure improvements, provides notice to 
developers, and delineates among property locations is required.32 
Alternatively, municipalities may establish geographic “service areas for 
the collection of development fees.”33 The final portion of subsection (C) 
requires both “a public hearing before the municipal planning commission” 
and “a subsequent public hearing before the municipal governing body” 
prior to the adoption of “any development fees, capital improvement plan, 
service plan, or creation of service areas.”34 The subsection also includes a 
grandfathering provision for previously adopted development fee schemes, 
                                                                                                                 
 27. Id. § 895(A)(1). 
 28. Id. § 895(B). 
 29. Id. § 895(B)(1). 
 30. Id. § 895(B)(2)-(4). 
 31. Id. § 895(C)(1). 
 32. Id. § 895(C)(2). 
 33. Id. 
 34. Id. § 895(C)(3). 
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but makes clear that any modification to such schemes must be in 
accordance with the new statutory scheme.35 
Subsection (D) reiterates that development fees must be limited to capital 
improvements to infrastructure and provides that the assessment of fees 
must be with significant detail and in writing.36 The subsection also 
provides for proportionality when changes are made in capital improvement 
plans or service areas and notes that such changes are also subject to the 
previously mentioned hearing process.37 Subsection (E) requires detailed 
annual reporting to the municipality’s governing body and allows for either 
the return of funds if the body determines the purpose for which the 
development fee was adopted has been fully funded or for a repurposing of 
the funds through the hearing process set out in Subsection (C)(3).38 
Subsection (F) requires that fees not be collected prior to issuance of a 
building permit.39 Subsection (G) allows municipalities to contract with 
developers for the construction of the necessary infrastructure 
improvements and to credit the improvements made against the assessed 
development fee.40 
Subsection (H) clarifies that the statute is not meant to preclude real 
estate exactions.41 Subsection (I) makes credits against development fees 
nontransferable.42 Subsection (J) establishes accounting standards and the 
level of detail required to be available as public record.43 Subsection (K) 
defines the standard by which a reviewing court will uphold a challenged 
development fee scheme.44 Specifically, the subsection provides that a 
development fee scheme will be reviewed through “rational-basis scrutiny,” 
and that the fee will be upheld if it “substantially complies with this section 
and if the municipality documented reasonably conceivable facts that 
provided a rational basis for the adoption.”45 
Subsection (L) clarifies that imposition of development fees is not 
required and illustrates the standards through which a governing body can 
                                                                                                                 
 35. Id. 
 36. See id. § 895(D). 
 37. Id. § 895(D)(2).  
 38. See id. § 895(E). 
 39. Id. § 895(F). 
 40. Id. § 895(G). 
 41. See id. § 895(H). 
 42. Id. § 895(I). 
 43. Id. § 895(J). 
 44. Id. § 895(K). 
 45. Id. 
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allow a developer to apply for exemption from the imposition of a fee.46 
Subsection (M) makes clear that payment of a development fee will not be 
deemed a waiver of the right to challenge the imposition of the fee at a later 
time.47 Subsection (N) precludes a municipality from recovering 
infrastructure costs through the imposition of connection fees in addition to 
development fees.48 Subsection (O) clarifies that municipalities can self-
fund infrastructure improvements through methods other than development 
fees, reiterating the notion that the act is not preclusive concerning 
municipal choice for infrastructure.49 
Clearly, the statute imposes an onerous framework with which a 
municipality must comply if it is to assess development fees. This comment 
does not address the potential implications of the burdens of this taxation 
system (for example, that the scheme might lead a municipality to 
altogether abandon development fees), but instead seeks to predict what a 
court will find necessary for compliance in a few key areas and how much 
greater of a burden is placed upon municipalities above the extended 
constitutional baseline. Additionally, this comment seeks to gauge how a 
court will address vague, misleading, and conflicting language within the 
statute, as some of the language, if given its traditional importance, 
conflicts with the whole of the statutory requirements. Should this statute 
come under court scrutiny, significant harmonization will be necessary. 
With the striking demographic changes within Oklahoma’s major cities, 
this will become an issue as urban and suburban interests diverge.50 
B. Adjudicative Issues 
Most of section 895 addresses administrative procedure.51 As well, it 
unequivocally limits development fees to “public infrastructure system 
capital improvements.”52 It is worth noting though that development fees in 
the context of the statue do not simply mean fees assessed upon new 
development as a result of the impact of the new development. For the 
purposes of the statute, a development fee is “payment of money 
                                                                                                                 
 46. Id. § 895(L). 
 47. Id. § 895(M). 
 48. Id. § 895(N). 
 49. See id. § 895(O). 
 50. See generally Dale Funk, Oklahoma City’s Rebound, ELEC. WHOLESALING, Apr. 
2011, at 22-24; D. Ray Tuttle, Timing Success in Tulsa: Developers Assess Downtown’s 
Growth, Potential, J. REC. (Nov. 8, 2011, 6:27 PM) http://journalrecord.com/2011/11/08/ 
timing-success-in-tulsa-developers-assess-downtown’s-growth-potential-real-estate/. 
 51. See 62 OKLA. STAT. § 895. 
 52. Id. § 895(B)(4). 
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imposed . . . as a condition of approval of any building permit, plat 
approval, or zoning change, to the extent the fee is to pay for public 
infrastructure systems that are attributable to new development or to 
expand or modify existing development.”53 However, two subsections stand 
out among the others as most important to adjudicative determinations: 
subsection (B)(1) and subsection (K). 
Subsection (B)(1) states: 
 B. New development and expanded or modified existing 
development may only be charged the development fee for 
capital improvement costs for increases or expansion to the 
capacity of public infrastructure systems attributable to that 
development. 
 1. Development fees shall not exceed a clear, ascertainable, 
and reasonably determined proportionate share of the cost of 
capital improvement to the public infrastructure system 
attributable to the expansion or increase in functional service 
capacity generated, or to be generated by, the development being 
charged the fee. There shall be a clearly established functional 
nexus between the purpose and amount of the development fee 
being charged and the development against which the fee is 
charged. In determining the development fee, the municipality 
shall make a documented effort to quantify the projected impact 
from development and determine that the proposed development 
fee is reasonably and roughly proportional to the nature and 
extent of the impact of development.54 
The particularly important phrases are emphasized above. The subsection 
mandates that “[d]evelopment fees shall not exceed a clear, ascertainable, 
and reasonably determined proportionate share of the cost of 
[infrastructure] capital improvement.”55 Though the statute requires the 
municipality to document estimates and costs,56 precision and 
proportionality will be a judicial determination if challenged. The 
subsection also provides that there must be a “clearly established functional 
nexus between the purpose and amount of the development fee being 
                                                                                                                 
 53. Id. § 895(A)(1) (emphasis added). 
 54. Id. § 895(B) (emphases added). 
 55. Id. § 895(B)(1). 
 56. See id. § 895(B)(1), (3). 
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charged” and the new development.57 This standard will also need to be 
clarified by the courts and will likely be compared to the “essential nexus” 
test developed by the United States Supreme Court in Nollan v. California 
Coastal Commission.58 Finally, the subsection establishes that a proposed 
development fee must be “reasonably and roughly proportional to the 
nature and extent of the impact of development,” again making degree of 
proportionality a matter of judicial concern.59 
Subsection (K) requires: 
K. Any ordinance, resolution, or regulation adopted in 
compliance with this section which is thereafter challenged in 
any future court action shall be reviewed through rational-basis 
scrutiny, such that it shall be upheld if it substantially complies 
with this section and if the municipality documented reasonably 
conceivable facts that provided a rational basis for the 
adoption.60 
Again, the significant language is emphasized. This subsection also 
presents unique problems, both announcing “rational-basis scrutiny” for 
judicial review and mandating substantial compliance with the statute.61 
However, development fee assessments or schemes that would be 
permissible under rational basis scrutiny are foreclosed by the statute. It 
will be necessary for a court to harmonize this subsection with the whole of 
the statute and to clarify the meaning of the statutory judicial review 
requirements, likely limiting the application of rational basis scrutiny. 
IV. Constitutional Background 
The Takings Clause of the United States Constitution provides that 
private property shall not “be taken for public use, without just 
compensation.”62 As the language of section 895 bears much in common 
with the United States Supreme Court’s rulings on property exactions, a 
court ruling on the statute would likely at least look to those rulings for 
comparison. Though the Supreme Court has ruled on similar taxation 
schemes involving Fifth Amendment Takings Clause concerns, the case law 
has not addressed impact or development fees. Instead, Takings Clause 
                                                                                                                 
 57. Id. § 895(B)(1). 
 58. See 483 U.S. 825, 836-37 (1987). 
 59. See 62 OKLA. STAT. § 895(B)(1). 
 60. Id. § 895(K) (emphasis added). 
 61. Id. 
 62. U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
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rulings by the Supreme Court have dealt with property exactions.63 In 
Nollan v. California Coastal Commission and Dolan v. City of Tigard, the 
Supreme Court established a test beyond simple rational basis to determine 
the constitutionality of municipal property exactions.64 Thereafter, lower 
courts divided in applying the Supreme Court rulings concerning exactions 
to development fees.65 As the property exaction cases have been widely 
analyzed, their presentation here will be concise.66 
A. Nollan v. California Coastal Commission: The Supreme Court Decides 
Rational Basis Just Is Not Enough 
Nollan was the first case decided by the Supreme Court directly 
addressing real estate exactions and the Takings Clause of the Fifth 
Amendment.67 In the case, the California Coastal Commission required the 
Nollans to deed the public an easement for beach access across their 
beachfront property in order to obtain a permit to demolish a bungalow on 
                                                                                                                 
 63. See Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374 (1994); Nollan, 483 U.S. 825. 
 64. Though not wholly accurate, the Nollan/Dolan standard is often characterized as 
“intermediate scrutiny” or “heightened scrutiny.” See, e.g., Loyola Marymount Univ. v. L.A. 
Unified Sch. Dist., 53 Cal. Rptr. 2d 424, 433 (Ct. App. 1996); Smith v. Town of Mendon, 
822 N.E.2d 1214, 1223-24 (N.Y. 2004); Dudek v. Umatilla Cnty., 69 P.3d 751, 754 (Or. Ct. 
App. 2003). 
 65. Some cases decline to extend Supreme Court exactions jurisprudence to 
development fees. See, e.g., Clajon Prod. Corp. v. Petera, 70 F.3d 1566, 1578 (10th Cir. 
1995) (holding that exaction case law is only applicable to physical intrusions or the 
functional equivalent thereof onto private property); Krupp v. Breckenridge Sanitation Dist., 
19 P.3d 687, 698 (Colo. 2001) (en banc) (holding a generally applicable service fee is not 
subject to the Nollan/Dolan three-pronged test). Other cases extend the exactions 
jurisprudence. See, e.g., Ehrlich v. City of Culver City, 911 P.2d 429, 447 (Cal. 1996) 
(holding a discretionary zoning permit conditioned upon the payment of fees imposed on an 
individual property owner implicated the heightened scrutiny of Nollan/Dolan); Ocean 
Harbor House Homeowners Ass’n v. Cal. Coastal Comm’n, 77 Cal. Rptr. 3d 432, 449-50 
(Ct. App. 2008) (refusing to overturn a mitigation fee despite appellant’s assertion of 
unconstitutionality under Dolan); Home Builders Ass’n of Dayton & Miami Valley v. City 
of Beavercreek, 729 N.E.2d 349, 355 (Ohio 2000) (“[I]mpact fees are closer in form to land 
use exactions than to zoning laws.”). 
 66. For a broad discussion of exactions and their space in the spectrum of Supreme 
Court Takings Clause jurisprudence, see Robert Meltz, Takings Law Today: A Primer for 
the Perplexed, 34 ECOLOGY L.Q. 307, 366-70 (2007). 
 67. By the time Nollan was decided, the Court had, of course, long recognized 
permanent physical occupation of property (for example, a traditional overland lateral 
easement) as a taking. See Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 
433 (1982) (describing the landowner’s right to exclude as “one of the most essential sticks 
in the bundle of rights that are commonly characterized as property” (quoting Kaiser Aetna 
v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 176 (1979)) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
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the property and replace the structure with a house.68 The California Coastal 
Commission reasoned that the new, larger structure would contribute to a 
psychological barrier of homes that would discourage citizens from 
utilizing the public beach.69 
The Court reaffirmed that “land-use regulation does not effect a taking if 
it ‘substantially advance[s] legitimate state interests’ and does not ‘den[y] 
an owner economically viable use of his land,’”70 and found that 
conditioning a building permit upon allowing an easement for public beach 
access fit this rubric.71 In addition, the Court required an “essential nexus” 
between the exaction and the harm created by the development.72 When the 
exaction “utterly fails” to alleviate the harm provided as justification for the 
exaction, constitutional propriety evaporates.73 
Therefore, the test at that time became two-pronged. First, the Court 
reaffirmed that an exaction by a state must satisfy the traditional substantive 
                                                                                                                 
 68. Nollan, 483 U.S. at 828. 
 69. Id. 
 70. Id. at 834 (alterations in original) (quoting Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 
260 (1980)). 
 71. Id. at 836-37. The Court expressly confirmed that a property exaction is not 
necessarily a taking despite appearances. Id. at 836. The Court provided its own 
hypothetical, requiring the Nollans to create a public viewing spot on their property, and 
stated that the power to deny or regulate construction derived from the state police power 
“include[s] the power to condition construction upon some concession by the owner, even a 
concession of property rights, that serves the same end.” Id. 
 72. Id. at 837. The Court stated, “If a prohibition designed to accomplish that purpose 
would be a legitimate exercise of the police power rather than a taking, it would be strange 
to conclude that providing the owner an alternative to that prohibition which accomplishes 
the same purpose is not.” Id. at 836-37. However, the Court defined an essential nexus in 
large part in the negative: “The evident constitutional propriety disappears, however, if the 
condition substituted for the prohibition utterly fails to further the end advanced as the 
justification for the prohibition.” See id. at 837. This method of definition has led to 
voluminous scholarly commentary. See, e.g., J. David Breemer, The Evolution of the 
“Essential Nexus”: How State and Federal Courts Have Applied Nollan and Dolan and 
Where They Should Go from Here, 59 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 373, 378 (2002) (defining an 
essential nexus as requiring “(1) a legitimate state interest or purpose; (2) a connection 
between that interest and the land use exaction chosen to address it; and (3) a minimal 
connection between the impacts of the proposed development and the land use exaction”); J. 
David Breemer, What Property Rights: The California Coastal Commission’s History of 
Abusing Land Rights and Some Thoughts on the Underlying Causes, 22 UCLA J. ENVTL. L. 
& POL’Y 247, 264 (2004) (representing an essential nexus as a “direct connection”); Frank 
Michelman, Takings, 1987, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 1600, 1612 (1988) (characterizing an 
essential nexus as “the Court’s insistence on being satisfied that the claimed nexus was 
sufficiently apparent and credible to counteract suspicion of taking by subterfuge”).  
 73. Nollan, 483 U.S. at 837. 
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due process inquiry of a legitimate state interest under rational basis 
examination,74 and clarified that a broad array of government purposes 
satisfy such examination.75 Second, the essential nexus test must be 
satisfied.76 Under this new test, the Court found that the California Coastal 
Commission’s asserted purpose of public beach access failed to meet the 
essential nexus requirement;77 the concern that the structure created a 
psychological barrier to public use of the beach would not be alleviated by 
granting a lateral easement across the Nollans’ property.78 The Court noted, 
simply, that if the Commission wanted an easement across the petitioner’s 
property, “it must pay for it.”79 
B. Dolan v. City of Tigard: The Supreme Court Clarifies that Left Unclear 
Dolan, the successor to Nollan, added a third element to the inquiry.80 In 
Dolan, the City of Tigard conditioned the petitioner’s building permit upon 
devotion of space to a greenbelt and bike path.81 The petitioner was 
required to dedicate a portion of her land that occupied a 100-year flood 
plain to drainage, as well as for a bike path pursuant to a state statute.82 
Despite her application, the petitioner was denied an exception from these 
exactions.83 The Court heard the case to clarify whether the “essential 
nexus” test had supplanted other determinations of causality when 
evaluating government exactions.84 
Though the Court found an “essential nexus” between the development 
and the exactions, it still struck down the exaction based upon an added 
                                                                                                                 
 74. See id. at 834. 
 75. Id. at 835. The Court surveyed prior case law, listing scenic zoning, landmark 
preservation, and residential zoning as permissible purposes upheld in prior cases. Id. 
 76. See id. at 837-42. 
 77. See id. 
 78. Id. at 838-39. 
 79. Id. at 842. 
 80. Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 391 (1994). Commentary widely discusses 
Takings Clause property exaction analysis as a “three-pronged” or “three part” inquiry. See, 
e.g., Jack Estill et. al., Taxing Development: The Law and Economics of Traffic Impact Fees, 
16 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 1, 7 (2006); James H. Freis, Jr. & Stefan V. Reyniak, Putting Takings 
Back into the Fifth Amendment: Land Use Planning After Dolan v. City of Tigard, 21 
COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 103, 116 (1996); Lawrence Watters, Dolan v. City of Tigard: 
Introduction and Decision, 25 ENVTL. L. 111, 117 (1995). 
 81. Dolan, 512 U.S. at 379-80. 
 82. Id. at 380. 
 83. Id. at 381-83. 
 84. Id. at 383. 
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“rough proportionality” consideration.85 The Court split the difference in 
what it perceived as a wide variance among states in determining the 
constitutionality of the relationship between the government exaction and 
the impact of development pursuant to its allusion in Nollan.86 The Court 
rejected both weak, general connection tests and stringent “specifi[c] and 
uniquely attributable” tests, instead favoring a middle ground of rough 
proportionality.87 Under this test “[n]o precise mathematical calculation is 
required, but [a government] must make some sort of individualized 
determination that the required dedication is related both in nature and 
extent to the impact of the proposed development.”88 
Thus, with the inclusion of rough proportionality, the test became three-
pronged: (1) the exaction must advance a legitimate state interest, (2) there 
must be an essential nexus between the exaction and the harm advanced as 
the impetus for the exaction, and (3) the exaction must be roughly 
proportional in nature and extent to the harm of the development.89 The 
Court remanded the case for a ruling consistent with the opinion, 
accompanied by a finding that the city’s requirement of public dedication of 
the proposed greenbelt did not meet the “rough proportionality” standard 
and suspicion of the lack of factual findings that the bike path would reduce 
traffic.90 
As a coda, the Court has significantly returned only once to its property 
exactions Takings Clause jurisprudence, in Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc.91 
In the case, the Court abrogated the “substantial advancement” test derived 
from Agins v. City of Tiburon.92 As Nollan and Dolan had cited and adopted 
                                                                                                                 
 85. See id. at 391, 394-96. 
 86. See id. at 391. To reiterate, the Court in Nollan did not comment upon the nature of 
the connection necessary in exactions evaluations as the easement requirement in that case 
did not meet “even the most untailored standards.” Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm’n, 483 U.S. 
825, 838 (1987). 
 87. Dolan, 512 U.S. at 389-91 (alteration in original) (quoting Pioneer Trust & Sav. 
Bank v. Vill. of Mount Prospect, 176 N.E. 2d 799, 802 (Ill. 1961)) (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
 88. Id. at 391. 
 89. See supra note 80 and accompanying text. 
 90. Dolan, 512 U.S. at 394-96. 
 91. 544 U.S. 528, 546-48 (2005). 
 92. Id. at 532. Though not of consequence in this matter, the “substantial advancement” 
test provided that government regulation of property effects a taking if it does not 
substantially advance a legitimate government interest. Id. at 531; Agins v. City of Tiburon, 
447 U.S. 255, 260 (1980), overruled by Lingle, 544 U.S. at 548. 
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the language of Agins,93 the Court determined it necessary to reevaluate the 
status of its property exaction Takings Clause jurisprudence.94 Though the 
Court noted similarities in language, the Court found the two tests 
incomparable, characterizing the Nollan/Dolan test as a determination 
“whether the exactions substantially advanced the same interests that land-
use authorities asserted would allow them to deny the permit altogether.”95 
Thereafter the Court declared that Lingle “should not be read to disturb 
these precedents.”96 
V. Lower Courts 
Lower courts have struggled considerably in determining the extent to 
which Nollan and Dolan are applicable beyond property exactions. In 
addition, when courts find that the cases apply to monetary fees, there is 
disagreement when the manner of imposition differs (i.e., whether the 
imposition is made on an individual basis or a jurisdiction-wide basis). 
Though some older Oklahoma cases suggest how an Oklahoma court might 
rule, the developments in higher courts since these decisions make their 
implications hardly determinative; furthermore, Oklahoma courts have not 
issued an instructive opinion since the issuance of relevant Supreme Court 
decisions. 
A. Lower Court Confusion: Supreme Court Dicta Breeds Chaos 
There has been ambiguous indication from the Supreme Court that the 
Nollan/Dolan decisions should not be extended beyond exactions of real 
property for public use. The Court stated in City of Monterey v. Del Monte 
Dunes at Monterey, Ltd.: “[W]e have not extended the rough-
proportionality test of Dolan beyond the special context of exactions—
land-use decisions conditioning approval of development on the dedication 
of property to public use.”97 The Court continued, stating that “the rough-
proportionality test of Dolan is inapposite to a case such as this one,” and 
that the Dolan test “was not designed to address, and is not readily 
applicable to, the much different questions arising where, as here, the 
                                                                                                                 
 93. Dolan, 512 U.S. at 385; Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm’n, 483 U.S. 825, 834-35 
(1987). 
 94. See Lingle, 544 U.S. at 546. 
 95. Id. at 547 (emphasis omitted). 
 96. Id. at 548. 
 97. 526 U.S. 687, 702 (1999). 
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landowner’s challenge is based not on excessive exactions but on denial of 
development.”98 
In Del Monte Dunes, the City of Monterey had repeatedly denied a real 
estate developer’s plans to improve a parcel of land.99 The Court found it 
necessary to address Dolan only because the intermediate court had cited 
the case in its decision, and the Court found that the case was inapplicable 
to denial of land use by regulation.100 Del Monte Dunes, therefore, is 
properly read only as making clear the distinction between land use 
regulation and exaction. As exactions and development fees are kindred, it 
is not appropriate to apply this differentiation to development fees.101 Thus, 
though cases following Nollan and Dolan have been suggestive, they have 
hardly been on point regarding fees. Thereby, lower courts have been in 
conflict determining whether the Supreme Court’s rulings in Nollan and 
Dolan apply when a party’s real property is not taken, but merely assessed a 
fee. 
Some courts have declined to extend the three-pronged test to impact 
fees. For example, in Krupp v. Breckenridge Sanitation District, the 
Supreme Court of Colorado declared Nollan and Dolan inapplicable to 
monetary impositions as a class of state actions.102 In that case, the 
Breckenridge Sanitation District assessed a plant investment fee upon new 
development, which was challenged under the principles of Nollan and 
Dolan.103 After surveying the development of Supreme Court exactions 
jurisprudence and noting the above pronouncement in the Supreme Court’s 
ruling in Del Monte Dunes,104 the court stated, “Because Nollan, Dolan, and 
their progeny applied heightened scrutiny only where the government 
demanded real property as a condition of development, we find that they 
                                                                                                                 
 98. Id. at 703. 
 99. Id. at 693-94. 
 100. Id. at 702-03. 
 101. As a historical note, development fees began as “in lieu of” fees and are often still 
presented in this manner. Rosenberg, supra note 4, at 202. Under this characterization, 
development fees are an alternative to or replacement for exactions and are fundamentally 
tied to the exaction process. Id. Such a conception of development fees would give assurance 
to a reviewing court that it was not overreaching in applying a taxation scheme tied in 
essence to the exaction process. See id. 
 102. 19 P.3d 687, 697 (Colo. 2001) (en banc). 
 103. Id. at 691-92. 
 104. Id. at 695-97. 
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are not applicable to a general development fee.”105 This sentiment has been 
reiterated by many state courts.106 
Some courts, however, have found the test applicable to fees. For 
example, in Ehrlich v. City of Culver City, the Supreme Court of California 
rejected the notion that Nollan and Dolan do not apply to “monetary 
exactions.”107 In that case, the petitioner was required to pay a $280,000 
recreation fee in order to acquire the necessary permits to demolish a 
recreation center and to construct a condominium complex.108 That court 
explained, “When such exactions are imposed . . . we conclude that the 
heightened standard of judicial scrutiny of Nollan and Dolan is 
triggered.”109 The court ruled that the city could not measure its loss based 
on the value of property that it had no right to control,110 and reaffirmed that 
“when a local government imposes special, discretionary permit conditions 
on development by individual property owners . . . Nollan and Dolan 
require that such conditions, whether they consist of possessory dedications 
or monetary exactions, be scrutinized under the heightened standard.”111 
This holding is also echoed in other lower court cases.112 
Additionally, courts have distinguished fees (and exactions) which are 
assessed individually by a regulatory body from general, statutorily applied 
impact fees,113 deriving this distinction from the Dolan Court’s instruction 
that rough proportionality and the essential nexus require “some sort of 
individualized determination.”114 Some courts have applied the 
                                                                                                                 
 105. Id. at 697. 
 106. See, e.g., Home Builders Ass’n of Cent. Ariz. v. City of Scottsdale, 930 P.2d 993, 
999-1000 (Ariz. 1997) (en banc) (upholding the imposition of a water resource development 
fee); McCarthy v. City of Leawood, 894 P.2d 836, 845 (Kan. 1995) (upholding an impact 
fee assessed for the purpose of road improvements based upon increase in traffic caused by 
development); Waters Landing Ltd. P’ship v. Montgomery Cnty., 650 A.2d 712, 724 (Md. 
1994) (upholding, relevantly, municipal impact fees, the proceeds of which were allotted to 
improvements in the area of development). 
 107. 911 P.2d 429, 444 (Cal. 1996). 
 108. Id. at 434-35. 
 109. Id. at 444. 
 110. Id. at 449. 
 111. Id. at 447. 
 112. See, e.g., Hollywood, Inc. v. Broward Cnty., 431 So. 2d 606, 614 (Fla. Dist. Ct. 
App. 1983); Home Builders Ass’n of Dayton & Miami Valley v. City of Beavercreek, 729 
N.E.2d 349, 355 (Ohio 2000) (“[I]mpact fees are closer in form to land use exactions than to 
zoning laws.”). 
 113. Benjamin S. Kingsley, Note, Making It Easy to Be Green: Using Impact Fees to 
Encourage Green Building, 83 N.Y.U. L. REV. 532, 559 (2008). 
 114. Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 391 (1994). 
2013]       COMMENTS 171 
 
 
Nollan/Dolan line of cases to municipal codes without reference to or 
reliance upon regulatory board decisions.115 In contrast, other courts have 
maintained that Dolan was specific in distinguishing particular, 
adjudicative exactions from broad statutory impositions, and thus have 
found the line of cases to be inapplicable to legislative impositions.116 This 
notion only further exemplifies the confusion of lower courts concerning 
the constitutional requirements of the Takings Clause as the clause applies 
to municipal fees. It is this considerable void that section 895 seeks, in part, 
to address. In light of the great degree of conflict, the text of the Oklahoma 
statute must legislatively impose a higher level of scrutiny resembling the 
Nollan/Dolan standard to ensure that the statute is in line with current 
jurisprudence. 
B. Oklahoma Rulings: The Sparse Prologue to the Statute 
As of April 2013, no apparent Oklahoma state court cases have directly 
addressed the implications of Nollan/Dolan after the handing down of those 
cases. Case law in this area has seen challenges to determine whether 
substantial interference with land ownership by the government constituting 
a taking has occurred.117 Challenges under the Oklahoma Constitution for 
fee assessments by municipalities to repay private dedication of utilities 
infrastructure have been brought as well.118 However, Oklahoma courts 
have neither had the occasion to interpret the Nollan/Dolan “essential 
nexus” and “rough proportionality” tests, nor had the occasion to consider 
the tests as applied to municipal fees. 
Prior to the Nollan/Dolan rulings, the Supreme Court of Oklahoma 
addressed the notion of proportionality.119 In Public Service Co. of 
Oklahoma v. Northwest Rogers County Fire Protection District, the court 
determined that a fire protection tax assessment scheme based upon 
                                                                                                                 
 115. See, e.g., Parking Ass’n of Ga., Inc. v. City of Atlanta, 450 S.E.2d 200, 202 (Ga. 
1994); Town of Flower Mound v. Stafford Estates Ltd. P’ship, 135 S.W.3d 620, 641-42 
(Tex. 2004). 
 116. See, e.g., San Remo Hotel L.P. v. City & Cnty. of S.F., 41 P.3d 87, 105 (Cal. 2002); 
Krupp v. Breckenridge Sanitation Dist., 19 P.3d 687, 695 (Colo. 2001) (en banc). For 
discussion, see Inna Reznik, The Distinction Between Legislative and Adjudicative Decisions 
in Dolan v. City of Tigard, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 242, 252-57 (2000). 
 117. See, e.g., Mattoon v. City of Norman, 1980 OK 137, ¶ 4, 617 P.2d 1347, 1348; Frost 
v. Ponca City, 1975 OK 141, ¶ 12, 541 P.2d 1321, 1323-24. 
 118. See Willow Wind, Inc. v. City of Midwest City, 1989 OK 171, ¶ 1, 790 P.2d 1067, 
1068. 
 119. See Pub. Serv. Co. of Okla. v. Nw. Rogers Cnty. Fire Prot. Dist., 1983 OK 96, ¶¶ 
31-36, 675 P.2d 134, 141-42. 
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property value bore the required “rational relationship” for constitutional 
propriety.120 The court stated, “If the value-based assessment has a rational 
relationship to the question of benefit conferred, it is not 
unconstitutional.”121 It is worth noting that the court also used language 
describing a “rational nexus” to determine constitutional propriety.122 Such 
a nexus, though, in this context, was only a method of describing 
proportionality and was not a nexus inquiry in line with Nollan. 
The importance of this decision is that it falls within the middle ground 
line of state cases referenced in Dolan to develop the rough proportionality 
test, though not in an exactions context.123 In Dolan, the Supreme Court 
recognized a collection of state court cases which characterized 
proportionality in exaction cases as a determination of “whether the 
requirement has some reasonable relationship . . . to the use to which the 
property is being made.”124 The Court adopted this view as the rough 
proportionality test.125 Though in a benefit context, rather than a harm 
context, this parallel suggests that faced with the opportunity, an Oklahoma 
court might apply the Nollan/Dolan line of cases to development fees. At 
the least, it supports the notion that an Oklahoma court would find 
commonalities where proportionality is concerned. However, this 
assumption is made both in absence of reference to the statute in question 
and without respect for the interim developments between the decision and 
the statute. 
The Tenth Circuit addressed the issue in Clajon Production Corp. v. 
Petera, which limited the applicability of the Nollan/Dolan analysis to 
situations involving developmental exactions.126 In that case, the petitioner 
challenged the Wyoming hunting and fishing licensing scheme.127 The 
Tenth Circuit denied the petitioner’s Takings Clause claims, noting the 
“distinctions between general police power regulations and development 
exactions, and the resemblance of development exactions to physical 
takings cases.”128 The court stated: “[W]e believe that the ‘essential nexus’ 
and ‘rough proportionality’ tests are properly limited to the context of 
                                                                                                                 
 120. Id. ¶ 36, 675 P.2d at 142. 
 121. Id. 
 122. Id. 
 123. See Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 390 (1994). 
 124. Id. (quoting Simpson v. N. Platte, 292 N.W.2d 297, 301 (Neb. 1980)) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
 125. Id. at 391. 
 126. 70 F.3d 1566, 1578-79 (10th Cir. 1995). 
 127. Id. at 1570-71. 
 128. Id. at 1579. 
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development exactions.”129 However, this decision is not instructive for 
multiple reasons. First, though development fees are similar to the licensing 
fees in Clajon Production, in that both are monetary impositions, 
development fees are analogous both in nature and purpose to property 
exactions. Therefore, development fees and property exactions bear a 
stronger analogy. Second, Clajon Production dealt specifically with a 
Wyoming statute and thus is not necessarily applicable or instructive in 
interpreting Oklahoma’s statutory provisions.130 Finally, and most 
importantly, the fundamental holding of the case was a decision based in 
regulatory takings law, rather than property exactions law.131 Though the 
Tenth Circuit made the blanket statement that the Nollan/Dolan holdings 
“are properly limited to the context of development exactions,” 
development fees are not imposed under the same general police powers 
involved in the imposition of licensing fees considered by the court.132 
Oklahoma federal district courts have only referenced the Nollan/Dolan 
decisions in a single reported case, ConocoPhillips Co. v. Henry,133 which 
was subsequently overturned by the Tenth Circuit.134 Even disregarding the 
procedural history, ConocoPhillips and the Tenth Circuit’s reversal of the 
case lend little clarification as the matter at issue was a state statute 
outlawing property holders’ rights to ban entrants from keeping firearms in 
locked vehicles.135 The heart of the issue was the extension of Takings 
Clause jurisprudence to a property use restriction, which the Tenth Circuit 
declined to do.136 Therefore the case is not instructive, as neither exactions 
nor development fees are concerned with the question of how restrictive of 
property rights a statute must be to impose a taking. Exactions and fees are 
obvious complete deprivations. 
Simply, there is a dearth of precedent regarding the application and 
extension of the Nollan/Dolan line of cases in Oklahoma. Though Public 
Service Co. is suggestive of extension, it is hardly determinative 
considering the subsequent developments. Therefore, it is reasonable to 
                                                                                                                 
 129. Id. 
 130. See id. at 1579-80. 
 131. Id. at 1580. 
 132. Id. at 1579. 
 133. See ConocoPhillips Co. v. Henry, 520 F. Supp. 2d 1282 (N.D. Okla. 2007), rev’d 
sub nom., Ramsey Winch Inc. v. Henry, 555 F.3d 1199 (10th Cir. 2009). 
 134. Ramsey Winch Inc., 555 F.3d at 1211. 
 135. Id. at 1202. 
 136. Id. at 1209. 
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view section 895 as a legislative extension into this void, in a move to avoid 
the muddled mess that has washed over other jurisdictions. 
Arguably, section 895(B)(1), which requires “a clearly established 
functional nexus between the purpose and amount of the development fee 
being charged and the development against which the fee is charged”137 
resembles the “essential nexus” test of Nollan.138 The standard that 
“[d]evelopment fees shall not exceed a clear, ascertainable, and reasonably 
determined proportionate share”139 of the infrastructure improvement aligns 
with the “rough proportionality” of Dolan.140 “Reasonably and roughly 
proportional to the nature and extent of the impact of development”141 more 
closely resembles the “rough proportionality” of Dolan,142 but addresses a 
determination standard for the municipality in assessment, rather than the 
court.143 Therefore, the issue to be determined is what standard, in 
comparison to the constitutional baseline, the statute intends to impose. 
However, any judicial determination will necessarily have to address 
section 895(K) as well. The subsection provides that a development fee 
scheme is subject to “rational-basis scrutiny” when evaluated by a court.144 
This notion, if taken at its traditional constitutional meaning, is antithetical 
to the entirety of the statute. The statute seeks to impose a burden upon 
municipalities far above “rational basis” when imposing development fees. 
Therefore, to square this provision with the remainder of the statute, a court 
must interpret this provision in light of the whole bill. 
VI. Statutory Construction 
Should a development fee scheme be challenged in an Oklahoma court, 
several of the provisions in section 895 will need to be clarified, and a 
variety of statutory interpretation principles will govern the outcome. 
Additionally, some of these provisions are in conflict with each other when 
applied to the statute. Thus, priority among the principles must be 
determined and applied, giving the highest deference to the principle that 
legislative intent is supreme. 
                                                                                                                 
 137. 62 OKLA. STAT. § 895(B)(1) (2011). 
 138. See Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm’n, 483 U.S. 825, 837 (1987). 
 139. 62 OKLA. STAT. § 895(B)(1). 
 140. See Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 391 (1994). 
 141. 62 OKLA. STAT. § 895(B)(1). 
 142. See Dolan, 512 U.S. at 391. 
 143. See 62 OKLA. STAT. § 895(B)(1). 
 144. Id. § 895(K). 
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A. Principles of Statutory Construction as Outlined by the Supreme Court 
of Oklahoma 
Before the rules of statutory construction are applied, there must be a 
determination that a statute is ambiguous or that the intent of the legislature 
is not clearly expressed.145 In accord, “When the Legislature has clearly 
expressed its intent, the use of additional rules of construction are almost 
always unnecessary and a statute will be applied as written.”146 The 
highlighted ambiguities and contradictions in section 895, however, easily 
meet this initial burden. 
As a first priority when interpreting and applying a statute, a court must 
determine the intent of the legislature: “The primary goal of statutory 
construction is to ascertain and follow the intent of the legislature.”147 It 
follows that, concerning section 895, the Oklahoma legislature intended to 
impose a comprehensive scheme for the adoption of development fees, and 
to limit such fees to public infrastructure capital improvements.148 
Secondarily, a court must determine the meaning of a statute in its direct 
language. According to case law, “The words of a statute will be given their 
plain and ordinary meaning unless it is contrary to the purpose and intent of 
the statute when considered as a whole.”149 This consideration will 
primarily be of importance in evaluation of subsection (K), which imposes 
“rational-basis scrutiny” on reviewing courts when considering section 
895,150 but will also be important in evaluating subsection (B). As 
previously mentioned, the plain meaning of this “rational basis” is 
antithetical to the intent of the statute and cannot be given its traditional 
constitutional definition, at least not in a broad sense. 
Additionally, “In order to avoid judicially imposing a different meaning 
from that the Legislature intended, [courts] will not place a strained 
                                                                                                                 
 145. See Samman v. Multiple Injury Trust Fund, 2001 OK 71, ¶ 13, 33 P.3d 302, 307; 
Bruner v. Sobel, 1998 OK 60, ¶ 9, 961 P.2d 815, 817; cf. Fuller v. Odom, 1987 OK 64, ¶ 4, 
741 P.2d 449, 452 (“[I]t is unnecessary to apply rules of construction to discern Legislative 
intent if the will is clearly expressed.”). 
 146. Samman, ¶ 13, 33 P.3d at 307. 
 147. Stump v. Cheek, 2007 OK 97, ¶ 9, 179 P.3d 606, 609; accord Hurst v. Empie, 1993 
OK 47, ¶ 18, 852 P.2d 701, 706; State ex rel. Cartwright v. Ga.-Pac. Corp., 1982 OK 148, ¶ 
20, 663 P.2d 718, 722. 
 148. See 62 OKLA. STAT. § 895(B)(4). 
 149. Stump, ¶ 9, 179 P.3d at 609 (emphasis added); accord Naylor v. Petuskey, 1992 OK 
88, ¶ 4, 834 P.2d 439, 440-41; Keck v. Okla. Tax Comm’n, 1940 OK 357, ¶ 7, 108 P.2d 162, 
164. 
 150. See 62 OKLA. STAT. § 895(K). 
176 OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 66:155 
 
 
construction on the plain words of a statute.”151 This requirement will also 
be of importance when determining what interpretation a court must give to 
subsection (K). This limiting mandate must be subordinate to the prior 
considerations though. Also, legislative intent is not recorded in Oklahoma 
in any manner in which a reviewing court would be comfortable citing in an 
opinion. As well, disharmony may be avoided by the provision that 
“[g]eneral words in a statute must receive general construction, unless 
restrained, explained, or amplified by particular words.”152 The extensive 
use of modifying words and phrases within the statute will make this 
provision instructive in the interpretation of the statute.  
Finally, “statutes must be interpreted to render every word and sentence 
operative, rather than in a manner which would render a specific statutory 
provision nugatory.”153 This will be of importance both in interpreting the 
provisions of subsection (B) as they compare with the Nollan/Dolan line of 
cases and in determining how a court will render the operation of 
subsection (K). This notion bolsters the presumption that the statute intends 
to impose strict standards beyond the baseline constitutional requirements. 
B. Application of the Principles to the Statute 
It is first necessary to determine the interpretation an Oklahoma court 
will likely give to the provisions of subsection (B), and how these 
provisions compare with the constitutional baseline. In Dolan, the Court 
clarified concerning “rough proportionality” that “[n]o precise 
mathematical calculation is required, but [a municipality] must make some 
sort of individualized determination that the required dedication is related 
both in nature and extent to the impact of the proposed development.”154 
From Nollan, a Court will likely find a lack of an “essential nexus” when 
the exaction “utterly fails” to advance the claimed legitimate interest.155 
Therefore, the “clearly established functional nexus” required by the statute 
may impose a more stringent burden of proof on the municipality prior to 
imposition of a development fee. 
                                                                                                                 
 151. Crutchfield v. Marine Power Engine Co., 2009 OK 27, ¶ 27, 209 P.3d 295, 305; 
accord Stump, ¶ 14, 179 P.3d at 613; Thornton v. Woodson, 1977 OK 185, ¶ 10, 570 P.2d 
340, 342. 
 152. Stump, ¶ 14, 179 P.3d at 613 (emphasis added); accord Okla. Tax Comm’n v. 
Fortinberry Co., 1949 OK 75, ¶ 14, 207 P.2d 301, 305. 
 153. State ex rel. Thompson v. Ekberg, 1980 OK 91, ¶ 7, 613 P.2d 466, 467; accord 
Stump, ¶ 14, 179 P.3d at 613; Matthews v. Rucker, 1918 OK 29, ¶ 5, 170 P. 492, 493. 
 154. Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 391 (1994). 
 155. Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm’n, 483 U.S. 825, 837 (1987). 
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1. “[C]lear, ascertainable, and reasonably determined proportionate 
share”156 
The first provision of section 895(B) that evokes the Nollan/Dolan line 
of cases is the provision that “[d]evelopment fees shall not exceed a clear, 
ascertainable, and reasonably determined proportionate share of the costs of 
capital improvement to the public infrastructure system attributable to . . . 
the development.”157 This standard readily brings to mind the standard of 
“rough proportionality” imposed by the Court in Dolan;158 however, this 
provision is a determination of the relationship of the amount of the 
assessed fee and the impact of the development, rather than a determination 
of the relationship of the proposed remedy (in Dolan, an exaction) and the 
impact of the development.159 Under rough proportionality, no 
“mathematical calculation” is required.160 However, “clear” and 
“ascertainable” carry a notion of precision and positive determination.161 
In Dolan, the Court surveyed many state approaches to proportionality, 
settling on what it found to be the constitutionally proper middle ground of 
a “reasonable relationship,” which the Court recoined as “rough 
proportionality” to avoid confusion with the rational basis standard of 
review.162 Oklahoma would likely have fallen into this middle path.163 
Certainly, the standard of “clear, ascertainable, and reasonably determined 
proportionate share” does not bear resemblance to the slack, generalized 
standards that the Court rejected as not sufficiently protective of property 
rights.164 However, it is possible that this language imposes by statute the 
proportional burden that the Court rejected as too stringent for a 
constitutional baseline.165 The Court called the heightened relationship 
requirement “the ‘specifi[c] and uniquely attributable’ test.”166 Under this 
test, “[I]f the local government cannot demonstrate that its exaction is 
directly proportional to the specifically created need, the exaction becomes 
                                                                                                                 
 156. 62 OKLA. STAT. § 895(B)(1) (2011). 
 157. Id. 
 158. See Dolan, 512 U.S. at 391. 
 159. 62 OKLA. STAT. § 895(B)(1). 
 160. Dolan, 512 U.S. at 391. 
 161. See 62 OKLA. STAT. § 895 (B)(1). 
 162. Dolan, 512 U.S. at 389-91. 
 163. See supra Part V.B. 
 164. See Dolan, 512 U.S. at 389. 
 165. See id. at 389-90. 
 166. Id. at 389 (alteration in original) (quoting Pioneer Trust & Sav. Bank v. Vill. of 
Mount Prospect, 176 N.E.2d 799, 802 (Ill. 1961)). 
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‘a veiled exercise of the power of eminent domain and a confiscation of 
private property behind the defense of police regulations.’”167 
In the case discussed by the Supreme Court as illustrative of the 
heightened standard, Pioneer Trust & Savings Bank v. Village of Mount 
Prospect, the Supreme Court of Illinois considered whether an exaction 
imposed upon a developer for the purposes of school and recreational 
facilities was constitutionally permissible.168 Though the court recognized 
that the need for the facilities was due in great part to the addition of 250 
residential units made by the development, it found that the need could not 
be solely attributable to the development.169 Therefore, the court decided 
any exaction not made necessary specifically and uniquely by a new 
development amounted to an unconstitutional taking.170 
Determining which standard is more appropriate is difficult. The terms 
“clear” and “ascertainable” align with the concept of “direct 
proportionality” under what the Court termed the “specific and uniquely 
attributable test;” however, a “reasonably determined proportionate share” 
is certainly evocative of the “reasonable relationship” which the Court later 
termed “rough proportionality.”171 Because the statute readdresses the issue, 
imposing “reasonabl[e] and rough[] proportional[ity]” at the end of the 
same subsection,172 and because the tenets of statutory interpretation 
mandate a statute be considered in full,173 the “clear, ascertainable, and 
reasonably determined proportionate share”174 will likely be determined 
akin to “rough proportionality.” 
However, there is no certainty an Oklahoma court will draw this 
correlation, despite the congruous language between Dolan and section 
895(B)(1); the statute (in this subsection and as a whole) certainly imposes 
a degree of specificity beyond Dolan. Likely, a reviewing court will look to 
the outgrowth of case law from Dolan in applying the statute, while also 
requiring specificity in the measurement of the impact itself. That is to say, 
the proportionality may be “rough,” but the variables must be exact. 
                                                                                                                 
 167. Id. at 390 (quoting Pioneer Trust, 176 N.E.2d at 802). 
 168. Pioneer Trust, 176 N.E.2d at 800-01. 
 169. Id. at 802. 
 170. Id. 
 171. Dolan, 512 U.S. at 389-90. 
 172. 62 OKLA. STAT. § 895(B)(1) (2011). 
 173. Stump v. Cheek, 2007 OK 97, ¶ 14, 179 P.3d 606, 609. 
 174. 62 OKLA. STAT. § 895(B)(1). 
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2. “[R]easonably and roughly proportional to the nature and extent of 
the impact of development”175 
This language is the standard under which a municipality must determine 
the cost of a fee, and the standard under which a fee will be upheld.176 
Certainly, based on plain language analysis, “reasonably and roughly 
proportional” invokes the “rough proportionality” standard of Dolan; and 
the standard establishes that “[n]o precise mathematical calculation is 
required.”177 Though the standard itself requires no mathematical 
determinations, the subsequent text of the statute establishes various 
estimate and cost invoicing requirements for municipalities.178 The practical 
effect of this provision is that no specific ratio is to be imposed upon 
municipalities instituting a development fee system, but a clear system of 
attribution must be in place. Perhaps it would be best to characterize this 
standard as “rough proportionality with details,” meaning the precise extent 
of the connection of the development to the infrastructure system need not 
be determined, but the amount or percentage to be required of a new 
development must be determined with the previously unrequired 
“mathematical precision.” 
3. “[C]learly established functional nexus”179 
Subsection (B)(1) provides that development fees and impact of 
development must evince a “clearly established functional nexus;”180 this 
standard is readily evocative of the “essential nexus” of Nollan. The entire 
phrase—“clearly established functional nexus”—does not appear 
significantly in real property law; therefore, a reviewing court will not have 
instructive case law on which to base its ruling.181 A court will have to 
compare the term “functional nexus” and the Nollan case law, and 
determine whether emphasis should be placed on terminology or proximity 
in subject matter. 
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 176. See id. § 895(B)(1), (K). 
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The exact term “functional nexus” is commonly found in bankruptcy law 
when determining whether an item is a household good.182 Specifically, the 
Fourth Circuit held in In re McGreevy: 
[T]he requisite functional nexus exists where—and only 
where—the good is used to support and facilitate daily life 
within the house. It is the household good’s use for these 
purposes that distinguishes it from a good that is merely located 
and used within the house. Pots and pans are household goods 
because they are used to support and facilitate daily household 
living; a model car collection, by contrast, is not a household 
good because it serves no such purpose.183 
Through this analogy, it is arguable that a functional nexus is fundamentally 
different from an essential nexus, as an essential nexus only requires a 
connection between a state’s legitimate aim and the exaction imposed.184 A 
functional nexus requires a much more existential connection, requiring 
items of property to be fundamentally tied together in nature.185 Under a 
functional nexus inquiry, the purpose of the development fee (the public 
infrastructure system) would necessarily support and facilitate the 
development itself. 
If the comparison holds, a functional nexus likely would require a 
stronger tie to the development than the essential nexus standard. This 
notion is bolstered by section 895(B)(4), which states that “[d]evelopment 
fees may only be imposed to recover or fund the costs of public 
infrastructure system capital improvements, including, but not limited to, 
the cost of real property interest acquisitions, rights-of-ways, capital 
improvements, design, construction, inspection, and capital improvement 
construction administration, related to one or more public infrastructure 
systems.”186 This notion is also supported by the statute’s aim of attempting 
to completely preclude a variety of constitutionally sound purposes for 
development fees not tied in function to development. 
                                                                                                                 
 182. See, e.g., In re McGreevy, 955 F.2d 957, 961 (4th Cir. 1992); Fraley v. Commercial 
Credit (In re Fraley), 189 B.R. 398, 401 (W.D. Ky. 1995). The term is also used in the First 
Amendment context for government actors, but the term is used in an interchangeable, non-
exclusive manner. See Hall v. Am. Nat’l Red Cross, 86 F.3d 919, 921 (9th Cir. 1996). 
 183. McGreevy, 955 F.2d at 961. 
 184. See Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm’n, 483 U.S. 825, 839 (1987). 
 185. Cf. McGreevy, 955 F.2d at 962; Michael G. Hillinger, How Fresh a Start?: What 
Are “Household Goods” for Purposes of Section 522(f)(1)(b)(i) Lien Avoidance?, 15 
BANKR. DEV. J. 1, 46-47 (1998). 
 186. 62 OKLA. STAT. § 895(B)(4) (2011). 
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However, this determination necessarily raises an additional issue: What 
is the range of public infrastructure improvements that support and facilitate 
a development? By statutory definition, the improvements must be real 
property improvements,187 but this is where the clarity ends. It is unclear 
whether educational or recreational facilities would be fundable through 
development fees. Curiously, they are absent from the list of acceptable real 
property improvements contained within the statutory definition of public 
infrastructure systems, though the definition does not purport to be 
exclusive.188 
Some courts have found these improvements within the acceptable range 
of public infrastructure systems while others have not,189 but it is arguable 
that such improvements are not tied to a development on a baseline, 
existential level. This disagreement among Oklahoma’s peers also supports 
a stricter definition of functional nexus as a legislative attempt to avoid 
confusion. If a functional nexus were interpreted to impose a connection to 
the degree that a public infrastructure system must be essential to the 
operation of a development, then educational and recreational facilities may 
fall outside of this requirement. However, under a broad interpretation of 
the standard of supporting and facilitating, such improvements might still 
be deemed acceptable under the statutory development fee scheme. 
Also at issue is the “clearly established” standard. In other contexts, this 
standard commonly arises in civil rights violation and qualified immunity 
cases.190 Such a comparison is unhelpful, however, as the term in the 
qualified immunity context deals with the degree to which an individual’s 
substantive statutory or constitutional rights are firmly rooted in the law.191 
Rather, in the context of the statute, “clearly established” concerns the 
degree to which the municipality must connect a development fee and a 
development. This language mostly serves to bolster the notion that the 
                                                                                                                 
 187. Id. 
 188. Id. § 895(A)(3) (“‘Public infrastructure system’ includes any real property 
improvement, fixture, or accession that is included within, but not limited to, any of the 
following categories of public systems.”). 
 189. Compare Wellington River Hollow, LLC v. King Cnty., 54 P.3d 213, 215 (Wash. 
Ct. App. 2002) (approving of impact fees assessed for the benefit of a school), with Bldg. 
Indus. Ass’n of Cleveland & Suburban Cntys. v. City of Westlake, 660 N.E.2d 501, 506 
(Ohio Ct. App. 1995) (striking down a fee assessed for park services as an unconstitutional 
tax). 
 190. For discussion, see Miranda Creviston Motter, The Clearly Established Test: What 
Is the Standard and Why It Wasn’t Followed in Wilson v. Layne, 29 CAP. U. L. REV. 513, 
516 (2001). 
 191. Id. 
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“clearly established functional nexus” standard is more stringent than the 
“essential nexus” standard of Nollan. 
In sum, the choice of the legislature to mandate a “clearly established 
functional nexus,” rather than to employ the available “essential nexus” 
terminology will place a reviewing court in the awkward position of 
weighing relevant legal subject matter against identical legal language that 
has specific and well-defined meaning. Interpreting legislative intent is 
paramount, but when competing interpretations are differing shades of the 
same aim (unlike the rational basis scrutiny question), rather than 
competing concepts, the plain meaning must be settled upon.192 The 
application of words’ “plain and ordinary” meaning that is required under 
the principles of statutory construction makes the phrase “functional nexus” 
analogous to the stringent definition that has been discussed and affirmed 
repeatedly in bankruptcy proceedings.193 This view is supported by the 
requirement that courts not place a strained meaning on a word or phrase.194 
If this interpretation is accepted by a reviewing court, an additional facet 
is added to the statute: not only are the acceptable purposes for 
development fees limited in kind, but they are also limited in nature and 
scope. It is hard to imagine that a roadway or transportation system, for 
example, that is specifically included within the ambit of the statute will 
satisfy the requirement of support and facilitation unless it directly services 
the development; the same can be said about police and fire protection. This 
distinction also calls into question the recreational infrastructure that is 
specifically mentioned within the statute.195 Regrettably, this is what a 
“functional nexus” necessarily requires.196 A court will have much to weigh 
in this consideration. 
4. “[R]ational-basis scrutiny”197 
The most problematic part of the statute is subsection (K), which 
provides that a fee scheme instituted in accordance with the statute “shall be 
reviewed through rational-basis scrutiny, such that it shall be upheld if it 
substantially complies with this section and if the municipality documented 
                                                                                                                 
 192. Stump v. Cheek, 2007 OK 97, ¶ 14, 179 P.3d 606, 609. 
 193. See, e.g., Local Union No. 38 v. Andershonis (In re Andershonis), 324 B.R. 247, 
249-50 (Bankr. M.D. Pa. 2004); In re Mason, 254 B.R. 764, 772 (Bankr. D. Idaho 2000). 
 194. Stump, ¶ 14, 179 P.3d at 609. 
 195. 62 OKLA. STAT. § 895(A)(3)(e) (2011). 
 196. Cf. N. Ill. Home Builders Ass’n v. Cnty. of Du Page, 649 N.E.2d 384, 389 (Ill. 
1995) (noting that a need to ease traffic satisfied the essential nexus standard). 
 197. 62 OKLA. STAT. § 895(K). 
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reasonably conceivable facts that provided a rational basis for the 
adoption.”198 A development fee subject only to the constitutional baseline 
review of rational basis, however, might be far broader than the preceding 
subsections of the act allow. In addition, such a review will fail to meet the 
constitutional standard of Nollan/Dolan if a court applies the statutory 
standard to fees.199 Indeed, Nollan referenced prior California Coastal 
Commission cases based upon rational basis review that were to become 
inconsistent with the holding of that case.200 Therefore, this phrasing must 
have separate importance from the traditional rational basis review, which 
will require torsion from a reviewing court. 
In defining rational basis, the Supreme Court stated, “[T]his Court’s 
cases are clear that, unless a classification warrants some form of 
heightened review because it jeopardizes exercise of a fundamental right or 
categorizes on the basis of an inherently suspect characteristic, the Equal 
Protection Clause requires only that the classification rationally further a 
legitimate state interest.”201 In this context, under rational basis, a 
development fee will be upheld if it rationally furthers a legitimate state 
interest. However, the limiting nature of the act may seek to preclude a 
variety of purposes that would be valid under this analysis (for example, 
fees for educational facilities). As well, rational basis is only one of three 
total test prongs that a property exaction must satisfy in Supreme Court 
Takings Clause analysis. 
The Supreme Court of Oklahoma has interpreted rational basis in the 
same light. For example, in Gladstone v. Bartlesville Independent School 
District No. 30, the court interpreted the rational basis test as a “highly 
deferential standard that proscribes only that which clearly lies beyond the 
outer limit of a legislature’s power.”202 The Supreme Court of Oklahoma 
has characterized “arbitrary, capricious, [or] irrational” statutes as falling 
                                                                                                                 
 198. Id. 
 199. The holdings of Nollan and Dolan are in addition to the requirement of meeting 
rational basis review. Necessarily, the constitutional baseline is beyond rational basis. See 
supra Part IV. 
 200. Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm’n, 483 U.S. 825, 830 (1987) (citing Grupe v. Cal. 
Coastal Comm’n, 212 Cal. Rptr. 578, 587-90 (Ct. App. 1985); Remmenga v. Cal. Coastal 
Comm’n, 209 Cal. Rptr. 628, 631 (Ct. App. 1985)). 
 201. Nordlinger v. Hahn, 505 U.S. 1, 10 (1992). 
 202. 2003 OK 30, ¶ 12, 66 P.3d 442, 448; accord Black v. Ball Janitorial Serv., Inc., 
1986 OK 75, ¶ 7 n.8, 730 P.2d 510, 513 n.8 (recounting the court’s application of the 
rational basis standard in a case involving neither suspect classification nor fundamental 
rights). 
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outside the bounds of rational basis.203 Thus, Oklahoma’s interpretation of 
this broad standard is in line with the traditional interpretation of rational 
basis scrutiny.204 A reviewing court will therefore have to harmonize the 
traditional function of the term with the goals of the statute. 
Again, according to Oklahoma case law, “The words of a statute will be 
given their plain and ordinary meaning unless it is contrary to the purpose 
and intent of the statute when considered as a whole.”205 Therefore, a 
reviewing court will necessarily need to construe the provision for 
“rational-basis scrutiny” with the aid of the subsequent clause which 
provides that a development fee scheme will be ratified “if it substantially 
complies with [the statute] and if the municipality documented reasonably 
conceivable facts that provided a rational basis for the adoption.”206 
Rational basis, in the context of the statute, must be taken to mean (1) 
compliance with the statute, and (2) a rational basis for adoption. Therefore, 
“rational basis” will be taken as meeting rational basis scrutiny within the 
enumerated categories. 
Though it may seem counterintuitive to render a phrase virtually 
inoperable in this manner, such a conclusion is supported by case law. For 
example, in Oklahoma Natural Gas Co. v. Corporation Commission, the 
court stated: 
It is a cardinal rule that in the construction of statutes the 
legislative intent must govern, and to arrive at the legislative 
intent the entire act must be considered, together with all other 
enactments upon the same subject, and when the intention of the 
Legislature can be gathered from the entire statute, words may 
be modified, altered, or supplied to give the statute the force and 
effect which the Legislature intended.207 
Therefore, even traditional, widely-recognized meanings can be altered or 
appended if the intent of the legislature makes such action necessary. 
An unlikely but frustrating possibility also exists. In viewing the 
imposition of rational basis scrutiny, a reviewing court might take 
subsection (K) as a cue from the legislature that it did not intend to connect 
development fees to the Nollan/Dolan line of cases. This outcome would 
                                                                                                                 
 203. Ross v. Peters, 1993 OK 8, ¶ 19, 846 P.2d 1107, 1116 (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
 204. See Nordlinger, 505 U.S. at 10. 
 205. Stump v. Cheek, 2007 OK 97, ¶ 9, 179 P.3d 606, 609 (emphasis added). 
 206. 62 OKLA. STAT. § 895(K) (2011). 
 207. 1923 OK 400, ¶ 16, 216 P. 917, 921 (emphasis added). 
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severely jeopardize any certainty, beyond the statute itself, a municipality 
might have in structuring its development fee scheme. However, because of 
the multiple connections between Nollan/Dolan and section 895, and the 
conflict of rational basis scrutiny with the aim of the statute, this seems 
implausible. 
A reviewing court will necessarily have to interpret the provision as 
beyond true rational basis; and, regrettably, this subsection realistically is of 
spurious value. The rational basis review provision can only be 
meaningfully applied to the purpose inquiry and cannot be applied to the 
extent inquiry, as the extent inquiry is a constitutionally (and now 
statutorily) mandated standard beyond rational basis. A provision 
mandating rational basis review is valueless when the remainder of the 
statute clearly imposes a burden beyond that standard for upholding a 
development fee scheme. This subsection only serves to confuse and is 
antithetical to the aims of the statute. 
C. Legislative History in Oklahoma, a Puzzling Contradiction 
When a statute is found to be ambiguous and statutory construction 
principles are not determinative, a court may look to the legislative history 
of a bill for direction in its interpretation. Substantive legislative history 
typically includes committee reports, official minutes, and transcripts of 
floor debates; Oklahoma courts have not shied from turning to legislative 
history when available in interpreting statutes.208 For example, in In re 
Estate of Little Bear, the Supreme Court of Oklahoma noted that legislative 
history may be accessed “in order to clear up doubt and to determine 
legislative intent.”209 Though the case dealt with an inapposite matter of 
American Indian law, it is beneficial to note that the Supreme Court of 
Oklahoma not only made the pronouncement of the propriety of 
interpreting legislative history, but also based its decision in part upon 
committee reports concerning the legislation.210 
However, it is important to reiterate that evaluation of legislative intent 
by an Oklahoma court is predicated on the court first finding that a statute is 
                                                                                                                 
 208. See, e.g., In re Estate of Little Bear, 1995 OK 134, ¶ 28, 909 P.2d 42, 52; In re 
Martin’s Estate, 1938 OK 322, ¶ 29, 80 P.2d 561, 565-66; cf. Todd v. Frank’s Tong Serv., 
Inc., 1989 OK 121, ¶ 5, 784 P.2d 47, 49 (explaining that when evaluating conspicuous 
federal law intent to preempt state law, legislative history can be considered to identify 
congressional intent). 
 209. 1995 OK 134, ¶ 28, 909 P.2d at 52. 
 210. Id. ¶¶ 32, 43, 909 P.2d at 52, 55-56. 
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ambiguous.211 “Where the language of a statute is plain and unambiguous, 
and its meaning clear and unmistakable, there is no room for construction, 
and the courts are not permitted to search for its meaning beyond the statute 
itself.”212 On this analysis, a lower court could look to legislative history to 
resolve an ambiguous point (for example, in this context, the meaning of 
rational basis scrutiny), but could not use intent to supplant plain meaning 
(for example, in this context, the functional nexus analysis). Ambiguity, 
though, can arise either from specific words and phrases or from the 
internal inconsistency of the statute.213 
In Oklahoma, however, little record of legislative history is maintained 
by the state legislature. Indeed, “[T]he Oklahoma system of recording 
legislative history does not include debates, explanatory committee reports, 
or other documentation which might shed light upon the reasons or 
considerations motivating the action or inaction on the part of the 
legislature.”214 The extent of legislative history maintained is solely the 
various iterations of each bill that are presented before its codification.215 
Official substantive legislative intent is not regularly kept.216 
However, official bill files, maintained by the legislature, contain each 
presentation of a bill from introduction to codification.217 This has been the 
practice of each house of the legislature since 1989.218 Intent of the 
legislature, to the extent it can be discerned, must be gleaned from the 
various iterations of each bill maintained. Thus, there is scant available 
legislative history through which to view vague propositions within the 
statute, and certainly no such history to which a reviewing court would be 
                                                                                                                 
 211. In re Martin’s Estate, ¶ 15, 80 P.2d at 563. The court stated, “If we are to examine 
into the history of the legislation and contemporaneous circumstances, we are compelled to 
admit that the act is ambiguous.” Id. 
 212. Id. (quoting McCain v. State Election Bd., 1930 OK 323, ¶ 0, 289 P. 759, 760) 
(internal quotation marks omitted). 
 213. State ex rel. Rucker v. Tapp, 1963 OK 37, ¶ 6, 380 P.2d 260, 263 (“Ambiguity of 
statutes may arise otherwise than from fault of expression. An ambiguity justifying the 
interpretation of a statute, is not simply that arising from the meaning of particular words, 
but includes such as may arise in respect to the general scope and meaning of a statute when 
all its provisions are examined. The courts regard an ambiguity to exist where the legislature 
has enacted two or more provisions or statutes which appear to be inconsistent.” (internal 
quotation marks omitted)). 
 214. State ex rel. Cartwright v. Ga.-Pac. Corp., 1982 OK 148, ¶ 32, 663 P.2d 718, 723. 
 215. Resources Regarding Oklahoma’s Legislative Measures, OKLA. DEP’T OF LIBR., 
http://www.odl.state.ok.us/lawinfo/billinfo.htm (last visited July 2, 2013). 
 216. Id. 
 217. Id. 
 218. Id. 
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comfortable citing. Because any interpretation of legislative intent must be 
inferred from the additions to and subtractions from the iterations of the 
statute, it seems a court would be more comfortable drawing its inferences 
from the statute itself. 
The willingness of Oklahoma courts to evaluate substantive legislative 
history and the unwillingness of the state legislature to maintain such 
history is a frustrating inter-branch conflict; and, none of the explanations 
for this conflict amount to cogent rationale. First, perhaps contrary to 
intuition, all legislative records are confidential unless specified 
otherwise.219 In accordance with Oklahoma statute, “The records and files 
of the Legislature, not otherwise provided by law to be open to public 
inspection, shall be confidential and privileged and may be released for 
public consumption only upon approval by the presiding officer of each 
house respectively.”220 Second, the legislature specifically excluded itself 
from inclusion in the definition of a public body in the Oklahoma Open 
Records Act.221 In short, the statute provides that “[a]ll records of public 
bodies and public officials shall be open to any person for inspection, 
copying, or mechanical reproduction during regular business hours.”222 
Public body, however, “does not mean judges, justices, the Council on 
Judicial Complaints, the Legislature, or legislators.”223 
The sequestration of legislative history in Oklahoma is not an accident of 
omission; it is a calculated and reaffirmed aim of the legislature that is 
reiterated in multiple statutes.224 For whatever reasons, the legislature has 
continued its policy of confidentiality despite the aid that legislative history 
would offer the judiciary and the public at large. Commentators have noted 
that this confidentiality is a recurring electoral theme, but little movement 
has been made beyond politicking.225 The Supreme Court of Oklahoma has 
                                                                                                                 
 219. 73 OKLA. STAT. § 73(B) (2011). 
 220. Id. 
 221. 51 OKLA. STAT. § 24A.3(2) (2011). 
 222. Id. § 24A.5. 
 223. Id. § 24A.3(2) (emphasis added). 
 224. See id. (defining “public body” as excluding the legislature); id. § 24A.5 (allowing 
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73(B) (“The records and files of the Legislature . . . shall be confidential and privileged and 
may be released for public consumption only upon approval by the presiding officer of each 
house respectively.”). 
 225. See John Estus, Oklahoma Lawmaker Exemption Keeps Public in the Dark on 
Records, OKLAHOMAN (Mar. 17, 2010, 8:33 AM), http://newsok.com/oklahoma-lawmaker-
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repeated its willingness to evaluate substantive legislative history when it is 
available (for example, when evaluating federal law);226 therefore, the 
blame for the history of the legislature remaining sealed lies entirely with 
the legislature itself. 
Certainly a full body of criticism of the use of legislative history exists. 
The most prominent of these refrains is the textualist view that input outside 
the corners of the document is superfluous and not instructive.227 These 
critics maintain that single intent is impossible to discern from the large 
body of the legislature.228 Critics of legislative intent also highlight that 
legislation is the product of intense debate and compromise that does not 
solely seek to further the core aim of the statute; many unrelated aims are 
tied into the final product.229 As well, textualists assert the danger in the 
possibility of manipulation of legislative history, especially on the part of 
the losing side of the vote.230 These critics also caution that legislative 
history has not undergone the rigors of the legislative process and is 
therefore at best unreliable and at worst an unconstitutional supplanting of 
the process of law-making established by the terms of the constitution.231 
Finally, many also maintain that turning to legislative intent is an 
unconstitutional delegation of power to the smaller committee from which 
the legislative history is derived, as the majority of instructive legislative 
history is derived from smaller committees and their reports.232 
Regardless of the merit of these arguments, the Supreme Court of 
Oklahoma has reiterated its willingness to evaluate legislative history to 
interpret ambiguous statutes.233 Though some states have taken a more 
                                                                                                                 
AM), http://www.tulsaworld.com/article.aspx/Open_government_in_Oklahoma_a_work_in_ 
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textualist view of legislative history, Oklahoma is not among this 
company.234 It is strange that Oklahoma courts are so willing to evaluate 
legislative history, despite its absence in the records of the state legislature. 
Yet, this is the reality. In fact, if anything, Oklahoma courts appear to be 
trending liberally in their usage of legislative history.235 
For what it is worth, the phases of the bill provided by the Oklahoma 
legislature can give some insight regarding the statute. Evaluation of the 
various iterations of the bill shows that the “reasonably and roughly 
proportional to the nature and extent of the impact of development” 
provision was added after initial presentation, as was the “rational-basis 
scrutiny” standard.236 The “functional nexus” standard remained constant 
throughout each variation of the bill presented.237 
The addition of the “reasonably and roughly proportional” standard lends 
credence to the proposition that the legislature intended to adopt the “rough 
proportionality” standard of Dolan, as the addition reiterates the 
requirements set forth in the beginning of the subsection without the 
additional modifiers. What the inclusion after the introduction of the bill 
means regarding “rational basis scrutiny” is difficult to determine, but is 
likely reflective of concern for the stringent nature of the statute.238 
However, the provision is of little practical value. The endurance of the 
“functional nexus” standard shows deliberateness by the bill’s author and a 
concurrence within the committees and the legislature as a whole. These 
examples illustrate the degree of inference required when evaluating the 
legislative history maintained and the paucity of useful directions that may 
be taken from it. The need for maintaining substantive legislative history in 
the Oklahoma legislature is obvious. 
VII. Examples of Other Issues 
Interestingly, as a concluding example of the potential problems beyond 
those discussed in this Comment, the manner in which a development fee is 
defined may frustrate the purpose of the statute. Redundancy caused by the 
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statutory definition and the statute itself also raises questions regarding the 
scope of the statute. Both the way a development fee is defined in nature 
and the way that it is defined in imposition create issues regarding the rest 
of the statute. 
A. Development Fee: A Strict Definition 
The definition of development fees is “any payment of money imposed, 
in whole or in part, as a condition of approval of any building permit, plat 
approval, or zoning change, to the extent the fee is to pay for public 
infrastructure systems that are attributable to new development or to expand 
or modify existing development.”239 It is arguable that a fee assessed on 
development not tied to infrastructure improvement is permissible and 
outside the reach of the statute because of the portion of the definition that 
clarifies a development fee exists “to the extent the fee is to pay for public 
infrastructure systems that are attributable to new development or to expand 
or modify existing development.”240 This observation, however, must be 
clarified by the statutory definition of “public infrastructure systems.” 
The statute enumerates eight categories of improvements falling within 
the definition of “public infrastructure systems.”241 However, the definition 
does not limit “public infrastructure systems” to the eight categories 
given.242 Under the statute, “any real property improvement, fixture, or 
accession” can be included within the definition of “public infrastructure 
system.”243 Thus, the seemingly limited definition of a development fee 
actually applies to purpose with a physical element. 
B. Internal Redundancy 
Section 895 provides in subsection (B) that development fees may only 
be charged for capital improvements.244 If evaluated in a vacuum, it appears 
the subsection mandates that fees only be assessed for the purpose of capital 
improvements. However, by statutory definition, a development fee is only 
a fee imposed for that very purpose.245 Thus, this redundancy introduces 
confusion and presents two alternatives: either the statute is simply 
redundant, or the statute is intended to be preclusive in the purpose in which 
                                                                                                                 
 239. 62 OKLA. STAT. § 895(A)(1) (2011). 
 240. Id. 
 241. Id. § 895(A)(3). 
 242. See id. 
 243. Id. 
 244. Id. § 895(B). 
 245. Id. § 895(A)(1). 
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any fee tied to development may be assessed. The development community 
would likely argue for the latter characterization as the statute seeks to 
broadly limit the scope of fees assessed on new development. 
C. Permitting and Zoning: An End-around? 
As well, by definition, development fees are only such fees that are 
assessed “as a condition of approval of any building permit, plat approval, 
or zoning change.”246 This definitional observation brings to mind an 
important question. If a development fee is assessed through a method 
outside of the enumerated means in the definition, can a municipality avoid 
the provisions of the statute? Because the definition does not contain the 
same “including but not limited to” language found in other portions of the 
statute, it appears that logically the answer must be “yes.”247 
An important determination is whether municipalities in Oklahoma have 
such power to assess the fee through, perhaps, a “connection” or 
“incorporation” fee; many municipalities assess fees in this matter already. 
Though subsection (N) addresses connection fees, it does so only when 
connection fees exceed the costs attributable to the new development. 
Certainly, this is a quick fix by the legislature if this is the case. However, 
with shifting demographics, such a change might be a political fight in the 
next decade. 
As well, simple timing may be enough to remove a development fee 
from the ambit of the statute. That is, even the phrasing of the imposition of 
a development fee would remove the development fee from the governance 
of the statute. If, for example, a developer became legally responsible for 
the amount of a fee at the commencement of construction, rather than 
payment being a prerequisite condition, a development fee scheme might 
altogether avoid the restrictions of the statute. Though a court might view 
this as a bald attempt to avoid the impositions of the statute, it cannot be 
disregarded that the “including but not limited to” language is noticeably 
absent in this portion of the statute, where it logically would be present. 
These additional concerns highlight the judicial mess this statute could 
create should development fees become a contested issue in the future. 
VIII. Conclusion 
The codification of section 895 displayed foresight by the suburban 
development community and its representatives in the Oklahoma 
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legislature. As Oklahoma City becomes more bipolar with the growth of the 
inner-city, disagreements regarding fair distribution of infrastructure costs 
are certain to arise. To use the argot of the ex-urbanites, it seems the 
growing urban population in the city has been cut off at the pass. However, 
through the languishing nature of the bill’s passage, the statute as codified 
is both imprecise in achieving its aim and possibly vulnerable to back-door 
exceptions. 
Though Oklahoma courts have not had the occasion to decide whether to 
extend Nollan/Dolan Takings Clause jurisprudence, it appears that section 
895 answers that question in the affirmative; the language of the statute 
draws parallels to the Supreme Court’s Takings Clause jurisprudence 
involving real estate exactions. This provides both a reviewing court and a 
municipality implementing a development fee scheme a degree of certainty 
beyond the language of the statute itself. 
Without question the most perplexing inclusion in the statute is the 
mandate that a reviewing court employ rational basis review when 
evaluating a challenged development fee system. As stated before, this 
provision is of no substantial value. The plain and ordinary meaning of 
“rational basis” must be abandoned for the sake of the statute as a whole. 
Therefore rational basis must be only a baseline in judicial review, 
rendering the subsection superfluous. 
The unfortunate aspect of the statute, however, is not its conclusions—it 
is the handwringing required to settle upon them. The legislature ignored 
available, clearly defined phraseology, and this has possibly led to an 
outcome outside of the legislature’s original intent. The history of judicial 
grappling with development fees begs for a level of clarity absent from the 
statute. A simple survey of nearby jurisdictions would have made clear the 
need for clarity and exactitude in this area of the law. However, the 
legislature chose both to use well-established language in a manner 
antithetical to the statute, and to adopt language used typically in an entirely 
separate context. Clarity, it seems, be damned. 
Substantive legislative history would have also been instructive in this 
matter; and, the Supreme Court of Oklahoma has an unquestioned history 
of utilizing substantive legislative history when it is available (for example, 
in the context of federal statutory interpretation). However, as substantive 
legislative intent is not documented because of a willful withholding by the 
state legislature, it is impossible to affirmatively determine intent, certainly 
so in a manner that would affect an interpretation by a reviewing court. 
Though criticisms exist of the utilization of legislative intent, Oklahoma 
courts largely have ignored them, even liberalizing their approach to its use 
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in recent cases. Oddly, this is in spite of the lack of state legislative history. 
Of the scant “history” that is available to the public, there is none that the 
court would utilize as the basis of its decision. 
Finally, the definitions create uncertainty regarding the scope of the 
statute. A court would have to pit legislative intent against logical 
conclusions if evaluating a development fee scheme that implicated such 
definitional problems. Also possibly significant are the potential loopholes 
in the manner of assessment of a development fee. The same is true 
concerning the time which fees are assessed. Depending upon the need for 
revenue, these scenarios may not be farfetched speculation. 
At its best, section 895 serves to ensure equitable allocation of costs to 
new development; however, at its worst, the statute is an attempt to 
maintain unfairly low assessments on new development. Oklahoma City is 
at the low end of the spectrum of imposed development fees. What is 
certain, however, is that this statute is an example of the damage that can be 
done to a bill if it is moved through more committees than necessary. The 
statute is, in a word, clunky. It is an inartful example of impulse and 
perhaps panic ignoring form and function. It may turn out that section 895 
is an onerous, bureaucratic, and completely avoidable bit of legislation. 
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